Description

The 6 November presidential election in Tajikistan took place peacefully, but restrictive candidate registration requirements resulted in a lack of genuine choice and meaningful pluralism. The campaign was formalistic and limited voters opportunity to make an informed decision. Extensive positive state-media coverage of the official activities of the incumbent President provided him with a significant advantage.

In a positive step, the Central Commission for Elections and Referenda (CCER) took measures to enhance the transparency an
d efficiency of the administration of
elections. Significant shortcomings were noted on election day, including widespread proxy voting,group voting, and indications of ballot box stuffing.

The presidential election was essentially conducted according to the same legal framework as the 2006 presidential election, despite previous OSCE/ODIHR recommendations aimed at improving the legislation. Existing shortcomings include unduly restrictive candidacy requirements and vague
provisions on essential aspects of the election process regarding voter registration, campaigning and
election day procedures. Noted restrictions on freedom of speech are not conducive to democratic elections. The legal framework needs to be significantly improved to provide a sound basis for the conduct of democratic elections.

The CCER held regular open sessions, contributing to the transparency of the election process. The CCER members actively discussed issues in a collegial manner and worked within legal deadlines.

In a positive step, the CCER adopted some instructions well in advance of the election. However,important procedures were left insufficiently regulated leading, at times, to an inconsistent application of the law. While all registered political parties are represented on the CCER, there are no provisions for balanced representation in the lower-level election commissions, which could
impact transparency.

In a welcome step, the CCER obliged all Precinct Election Commissions (PECs) to publicly display copies of results protocols.
The lack of a centralized voter register prevented any nationwide crosschecks for potential multiple entries in the voter lists and the process thus lacked safeguards to ensure the integrity of voter registration. PECs undertook concerted efforts to verify the accuracy of the voter lists through door-
to-door campaigns. However, the process of verification was inconsistent due to the absence of clear instructions. The CCER announced that some 4,034,000 voters had been registered by the deadline for voter list compilation.

Six candidates were registered for the election, in cluding the incumbent President. The law does not permit self-nominated independent candidates, which is not in line with OSCE commitments. One nominee, who fell short of the required number of supporting signatures, faced administrative obstacles in the collection of signatures and stated that some voters would not sign in support of her
candidature due to fear of government reprisals. The requirement of local authorities to certify the support signature forms effectively removed the right of labour migrants to sign in support of a
potential candidate.

Restrictive candidacy requirements, as well as the unreasonably high number of
supporting signatures required, present significant obstacles that are at odds with OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections.
The campaign was largely indiscernible and appeared to generate limited interest despite efforts by the government to promote public awareness.

The incumbent President undertook highly publicized visits throughout the country. The authorities did not provide safeguards against the misuse of administrative resources and the distinction between the state and political parties was often
blurred, which is contrary to Paragraph 5.4 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document. Youth were noticeably absent from the campaign, with the exception of the last days when they were mobilized.

Most candidates did not express views opposing the incumbent President. Overall, the campaign was formalistic and devoid of the political debate that is essential to a competitive campaign environment in which voters are provided with a genuine choice.
The state broadcast media allocated an equitable share of free airtime and campaign news coverage to candidates as required by law. However, extensive and positive coverage by the state broadcast media of the incumbent President’s official activities provided him with a significant advantage, which is at odds with Paragraph 7.6 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document.

Bias in favour of the incumbent President in the state media and limited accessibility of information from non-state and internet-based media raised concerns.

The election dispute resolution system remained largely untested due to the limited number of formal complaints filed to election commissions and courts. Remedies for violations of electoral rights are generally available in the law, although several OSCE/ODIHR EOM interlocutors expressed a lack of confidence in the effectiveness
of the system. Of the few submitted complaints, all were dismissed by the courts on procedural grounds.

There were no women candidates for president, although there was one woman nominee. Women
were significantly underrepresented at all levels of the election administration, including at the PECs observed on election day.

National minority issues and inter-ethnic relations were not touched upon during the electoral campaign. Unlike voter information materials, ballots were printed in minority languages.

While the authorities readily accommodated international observers and candidate representatives, they did not fully meet their commitment under para graph 8 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document to provide for citizen observer groups and other civil society representatives.

Election day took place peacefully. IEOM observers assessed election day negatively in a significant number of observations. IEOM observers noted a number of violations, including widespread proxy voting, group voting, and indications of ballot box stuffing. Basic reconciliation procedures were not followed during the count. Contrary to CCER instructions, the PECs often did not post the results protocols for public familiarization.